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Abstract
The use of concepts is a fundamental capacity underlying com-
plex, human-level cognition. A number of theories have ex-
plored the means of concept representation and their links to
lower-level features, with one notable example being the Con-
ceptual Spaces theory. While these provide an account for such
essential functional processes as prototypes and typicality, it is
not entirely clear how these aspects of human cognition can
arise in a system undergoing continuous development - pos-
tulated to be a necessity from the developmental systems per-
spective. This paper seeks to establish the foundation of an ap-
proach to this question by showing that a distributed, associa-
tive and continuous development mechanism, founded on prin-
ciples of biological memory, can achieve classification perfor-
mance comparable to the Conceptual Spaces model. We show
how qualitatively similar prototypes are formed by both systems
when exposed to the same dataset, which illustrates how both
models can account for the development of conceptual primi-
tives.
Index Terms: Concepts, prototypes, typicality, Conceptual
Spaces, Distributed Associative and Interactive Memory
1. Introduction
For a cognitive system to be able to perform at a level that is
comparable to humans, it should be able to form conceptual
structures as part of its knowledge representation capacities. As
concepts are recognised as being important for many aspects of
cognition, it is paramount for an artificial system to be able to
model conceptual knowledge, including the formation of proto-
types.
In this paper we examine two frameworks for modelling
human knowledge; one is based on Conceptual Spaces (CS)
[1] and the other, Distributed Associative and Interactive Mem-
ory (DAIM), is centred around the distributed nature of hu-
man memory and the temporal aspects of its functioning [2, 3].
As they are focussed on different aspects of human knowledge
these frameworks have both virtues and drawbacks. CS in-
herently models knowledge as summary representations which
makes it natural to model some of the more generic properties
of concepts. However, a CS is a rather static structure and from
a developmental perspective it is less clear how well a CS would
capture conceptual learning over time. Also, there are no inher-
ent temporal aspects in the model that could account for some
of the temporal aspects of human memory, thus a conceptual
space is more abstract as a model of human cognition. DAIM
on the other hand takes a more developmental approach and em-
phasises the low level associative and temporal properties of hu-
man knowledge acquisition. The question of reconciliation of
the two approaches thus arises: can the developmental DAIM
perspective be used to account for the structures and functions
hypothesised by CS models? This paper seeks to address this
question by applying both approaches to the same data set, to
assess the compatibility of DAIM with CS.
As an example case, we explore the ability of both frame-
works to model an aspect that is considered fundamental to
human-like knowledge representation, namely the formation
of prototypes which display typicality [4]. The observation
by Rosch that many everyday concepts are prototypical in na-
ture challenged the established notion in cognitive science that
concepts could be modelled using logical definitions1. Rosch
showed that many concepts cannot be logically defined because
they show typicality, that is, people judge certain instances of
a specific concept to be more typical than others. For exam-
ple, for the concept BIRD, a robin is thought to be more “bird-
like” than a penguin, a banana is more typical for FRUIT than
a pomegranate etc. It turned out that instances of a concept
exhibit a graded membership to an idealised prototype, so that
some instances are seen as more typical of the concept than oth-
ers.
Theories advocating this prototypical view of concepts have
been around for quite a while with many different flavours
[5, 6], but the general gist is that concepts are represented as
some kind of idealised version of the specific concept. So, for
the concept BIRD people would have an idea of the idealised
bird, and match any encounters they have in the real world to
this prototype version. The more similar a particular observa-
tion is to the prototype, the more they are inclined to assign this
observation as belonging to the prototype. It may seem unlikely
that all members of BIRD could be represented by one single
prototype, given the wide variety of birds. So a prototype should
be thought of as a summary representation, which specifies the
properties of the concept, where some properties are more im-
portant than others. These properties are not strictly necessary,
but rather they describe what members of the concept tend to
have. The process of identifying an object in the world entails
a matching to known prototypes. This matching takes the form
of a similarity measurement, rather than a logical “does it ticks
the boxes?” type of analysis. A prototypical account provides a
more naturalistic explanation of human data than a definitional
approach.
1The idea that concepts can be represented as a list of logical defi-
nitions which specify necessary and sufficient conditions is commonly
known as the Classical Theory.
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2. Theory of the two frameworks
2.1. Theory of Conceptual Spaces
A conceptual space consists of a geometrical representation in
vector space along various quality dimensions. A CS is a collec-
tion of one or more domains (like colour, shape, or tone), where
a domain is postulated as a collection of inseparable sensory-
based quality dimensions with a metric. Examples of quality di-
mensions are weight, temperature, brightness, pitch, loudness,
and RGB values. For instance, to express a point in the colour
domain using RGB encoding, the different quality dimensions
red, green, and blue are all necessary to express a certain colour
and are therefore inseparable. Other domains may consist of
one or more quality dimensions. In its simplest form, a concept
can be represented as a point in the conceptual space, where the
coordinates of the point determine the features of the concept.
For example, an instance of the concept RED may be repre-
sented as a point (255, 0, 0) in the RGB colour domain.
Crucially to modelling concepts in a CS is the ability to take
a distance measurement. For each of the dimensions involved,
a suitable metric to calculate distance between coordinates on
this dimension must be defined. For a lot of dimensions the
Euclidean distance may be the most appropriate one, but the
Manhattan distance can also be used.
The notion of prototypes comes naturally to conceptual
space modelling, as the inherent distance metric can easily func-
tion as a notion of typicality. Distance dxy between a prototype
x and and an example y takes the general form:
dxy =
(
N∑
i=1
wi|xi − yi|r
) 1
r
(1)
where r denotes the type of metric with r = 1 for the Man-
hattan distance and r = 2 for the Euclidean distance and w an
optional weight of the dimension. To do justice to psychologi-
cal evidence of how people tend to rate concepts [7, 8], we can
convert the distance into a similarity measurement. Similarity
s between i and j is computed as an exponentially decaying
function of distance:
sij = e
−cdij (2)
where c is a sensitivity parameter.
Within a conceptual space we can model the learning of
prototypes by exposing the model to examples with associated
labels. After the learning the model is able to classify new ex-
amples as belonging to some known class, and specify how typ-
ical the example is, i.e. to what extent it belongs to the class and
to other learned classes.
2.2. Theory of the Distributed Memory Model
The DAIM system operates on a set of functional principles de-
rived from the operation of memory within biological system,
embedded within the context of a wider cognitive system [9, 3].
These are as follows [3]: (1) memory as being fundamentally
associative; (2) memory, rather than being a passive storage
device, is an active component in cognition through activation
dynamics; (3) memory as having a distributed structure; and fi-
nally (4) activation-based priming as subserved by the first three
points. A DAIM model has been implemented that embodies
each of these principles of operation.
Assuming that this memory system is embedded within a
wider agent cognitive system with multiple sensory and motor
modalities, associations may be formed based on the experi-
ences of the agent, which subsequently form the substrate for
activation dynamics. Prior experience as encoded in associative
networks, i.e. memory, thus play an active role in the genera-
tion of ongoing behaviour through the mechanism of priming,
which is the reactivation of modality-specific representations on
the basis of existing associations. These principles may be used
to provide candidate mechansims for a wide range of cognitive
phenomena, from visual recognition and analogies [10, 11], to
episodic memory, language development and social interaction
[9].
In this study, the notional ‘embodiment’ of the DAIM sys-
tem is modelled by an idealised set of inputs i.e. the properties
given in the dataset. Associations are formed between input
properties, on the basis of activation dynamics (where a high
activation level is assigned to a property that is present). These
associations have a weight value that is manipulated through-
out the operation of the system. This introduces a significant
temporal effect, in that an association is continually subject to
change based on the relative activation levels of the things it
associates, using a Hebbian-like update mechanism. Thus, by
extension, the order of learning also has effect on the behaviour
of the system.
Implementation of the model is based on an extension to
an Interactive Activation and Competition (IAC) model of face
learning [12], and uses an explicit representation for associa-
tions: i.e. an association is encoded as an object2, following
[13]. While details of this implementation are excluded here
due to space constraints, the following description outlines the
primary mechanisms.
The weight update mechanism incorporates both Hebbian
and anti-Hebbian rules, and essentially has the effect of turning
the DAIM implementation into a pseudo-correlation engine, in
which the strength of the weights encoding conjunctions of in-
put features essentially reflects the correlation of those features
based on prior experience. It should be noted that this is not
a correlation in the proper sense, but only an analogue thereof,
given the incremental update nature of the weight adjustment.
Activation dynamics are also at play, with all input properties
having an associated activation level. Activation for a particular
property rises if it is present, and falls in the absence of stim-
ulation (i.e. activation decay, to a negative activation ‘resting’
state). It should be noted that such stimulation can be sourced
either from external stimulation, or from the result of activation
flowing through already existing associations. A new associa-
tion is formed between two properties if an association does not
already exist, and if the activation of both properties is above
zero.
3. Modelling prototypes using the dataset
To examine how both models are able to build conceptual struc-
tures that exhibit prototypes and typicality effects, we use the
Zoo Data Set from the UCI Machine Learning Repository [14]
which is a simple database containing 101 example animals
with 16 different properties (like airborne, aquatic, predator
etc.) divided into 7 classes. All properties are binary, except
for the ‘number of legs’. This property is normalized as to
make it more in line with the other properties. Both models
are exposed to a subset of this data (50 animals), and the result-
ing knowledge structures are compared by using a further non-
2In the context of Object-Oriented Programming.
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Table 1: Typicality ratings of the CS model for the 10 examples
from the test set.
example MA BI FI AM INS INV
moth 0.08 0.12 0.05 0.09 0.49 0.12
newt 0.11 0.14 0.21 0.37 0.09 0.13
octopus 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.13 0.12 0.32
opossum 0.37 0.08 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.06
oryx 0.53 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.05
ostrich 0.10 0.25 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.08
parakeet 0.07 0.39 0.07 0.07 0.13 0.06
penguin 0.08 0.20 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.10
pheasant 0.07 0.57 0.08 0.09 0.15 0.08
pike 0.08 0.08 0.40 0.13 0.05 0.10
overlapping subset of the data as probes3. For the CS the train-
ing data is provided with an associated word label that specifies
the class, while for the DAIM system the class label and the
class type as a numerical value are supplied in the same fash-
ion as the 16 other properties, thus this system is exposed to
18 properties per example. The test data contains 50 examples,
where the breakdown into classes is as follows: 24 MAMMAL,
7 FISH, 9 BIRD, 4 INVERTEBRATE, 1 AMPHIBIAN and 5
INSECT.
3.1. Assesment
After training the systems are tested with 10 examples that are
not part of the training set. Based on the learned information,
an assessment of which category a newly presented instance be-
longs to is made. To examine the typicality ratings for the dif-
ferent examples the similarity measure from equation 2 is used.
3.2. Conceptual spaces
Using a CS representation, for each item in the test set we obtain
typicality ratings for all classes (see Table 1). All examples
from the test set are classified correctly.
Focussing more on the BIRD class, we can clearly observe
typicality effects, as shown in Figure 1. For the BIRD class, the
pheasant is the most typical example, followed by the parakeet,
the ostrich and finally the penguin. This is in line with human
typicality ratings as for instance reported in [15], [16] and [17],
except for the fact that pheasant is rated as more typical than
parakeet. Upon closer inspection it turns out that the property
‘domestic’, which is true for a parakeet, is somewhat rare for
BIRD and therefore the parakeet is rated as less typical. We
speculate that the contrast with typicality ratings from human
data is due to the fact that a property ‘domestic’ may not com-
monly be very prominent for people when classifying birds.
3.3. Distributed memory model
In order to assess the effects of presentation order, we run the
DAIM system twice with the same dataset; once in alphabetical
order of animal name, and the second in reverse alphabetical or-
der. Because of the inherently temporal dynamics of the system,
for this case study, the properties of each animal instance are
presented for 5 time-steps4 followed by a delay of 10 time-step
in which no input is presented so that all activation can decay
3We chose a subset of the Zoo Data Set because to show the proto-
type effects the full dataset is not necessary. This is an arbitrary choice,
we just choose the first 50 examples from a list in alphabetical order.
4A time-step resolution of 0.2s is used.
Figure 1: Normalised typicality ratings of the CS model for the
four probe trial birds for the BIRD class.
to the resting state. For the probe trials, all of the properties for
the unknown animal instances (except the name and type prop-
erties) are presented for 5 time-steps, with the activation levels
on the type properties read out at the end of this period.
Table 2: Normalised results of the DAIM model for alphabetical
presentation order: all correct.
PROBE MA BI FI AM INS INV
moth 0.01 0.08 0.00 0.22 0.49 0.19
newt 0.12 0.08 0.08 0.52 0.06 0.14
octopus 0.00 0.04 0.07 0.32 0.20 0.34
opossum 0.63 0.00 0.00 0.30 0.02 0.01
oryx 0.78 0.00 0.00 0.16 0.01 0.00
ostrich 0.01 0.58 0.00 0.30 0.08 0.01
parakeet 0.00 0.55 0.01 0.18 0.22 0.02
penguin 0.00 0.50 0.02 0.40 0.02 0.03
pheasant 0.00 0.53 0.01 0.25 0.15 0.02
pike 0.01 0.01 0.42 0.40 0.00 0.14
Table 3: Normalised results of the DAIM model for reverse-
alphabetical presentation order: all but octopus are correct.
PROBE MA BI FI AM INS INV
moth 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.31 0.41 0.21
newt 0.05 0.03 0.25 0.54 0.00 0.13
octopus 0.00 0.04 0.13 0.35 0.09 0.34
opossum 0.56 0.00 0.02 0.36 0.01 0.02
oryx 0.70 0.00 0.02 0.23 0.01 0.00
ostrich 0.00 0.52 0.03 0.39 0.02 0.01
parakeet 0.00 0.54 0.04 0.25 0.08 0.03
penguin 0.00 0.40 0.10 0.39 0.03 0.04
pheasant 0.00 0.48 0.04 0.32 0.06 0.04
pike 0.01 0.02 0.50 0.35 0.00 0.09
The resulting typicality ratings, normalised, are shown in
Table 2 and Table 3, for the two differently ordered data sets.
Even though the typicality values differ for the two different
data set orders, we can observe qualitatively similar results in
terms of how the probe trials are classified. All but the octo-
pus are assigned the same (correct) class and in this case of
misclassification the typicality rating of the correct response is
very close (0.35 and 0.34 respectively). Figure 2 shows typi-
cality ratings for the BIRD class for the four bird examples in
Proceedings of the Post-Graduate Conference on Robotics and Development of Cognition 
10-12 September 2012, Lausanne, Switzerland
10
the probe trials. As can be seen, penguin and ostrich are hardly
considered typical of BIRD, whereas parakeet and pheasant are
rated as being much more typical. This is comparable to the
result from CS, as displayed in Figure 1.
Figure 2: Normalised mean typicality ratings of the DAIM
model for the four birds presented in two probe trials. All four
were classified correctly, but note that penguin and ostrich are
far less typical of the bird concept than parakeet and pheasant.
4. Discussion and conclusions
In this paper we have compared two knowledge representation
frameworks for their ability to model conceptual prototypes.
While Conceptual Spaces are quite suitable for this as they in-
corporate a notion of distance that can very easily be used as
a typicality measure, it is less clear how this should happen in
models that incorporate temporal aspects and are inherently dis-
tributed in nature. Whilst the temporal effects (as encountered
in the order of presentation of the 50 instances to be learned)
have a demonstrable effect on the behaviour of the system, the
approach used in DAIM nevertheless demonstrates a robustness
of ability to correctly classify the newly presented instances.
Furthermore, the DAIM results for the typicality ratings for
the BIRD class exhibit prototypicality effects that are qualita-
tively similar to those obtained using a CS representation and to
those found in human subjects. This shows the feasibility of the
DAIM model, as the prototype effects are deemed important
for conceptual modelling. Being inherently temporal and dis-
tributed, the use of memory models like DAIM can account for
some of the more low-level functioning of the human memory,
within a developmental framework (i.e. the history of interac-
tion of the agent has a material effect on the competencies of
the agent [2, 3, 13]). The comparison of the two memory con-
ditions (normal and reverse order of data presentation) demon-
strates that despite this sensitivity to interaction history (in this
case order of presentation), there is nevertheless a robustness
apparent in the outputs of the two trained systems. The fact
that crucial aspect of modelling concepts, like prototypicality
(which can more easily be modelled in a generic framework like
CS) can be accounted for may be considered as an argument in
favour of a distributed representation perspective; not being able
to account for these aspects would constitute a shortcoming.
However, whilst the results of the DAIM system compare
favourably with the standard CS implementation, it remains to
be seen how such a distributed representation scheme can ac-
count for higher level concept manipulation. For example, the
advantage of the CS representation scheme is the collapsing of
multiple linked dimensions into a single point, that encodes a
single concept or prototype. As such, it is readily available for
further comparative operations with other concepts, and perhaps
even higher-level processing. This property of the CS model is
not so readily envisaged with the DAIM system given the en-
tirely distributed nature of all acquired information.
Nevertheless, this study has demonstrated that some funda-
mental aspects of conceptual modelling can be accounted for in
a distributed system that emphasises associative processes em-
bedded within a complete cognitive system, engaged in ongoing
development.
5. Acknowledgements
This work is funded by the CONCEPT project (EPSRC
EP/G008353/1) and by the EU FP7 ALIZ-E project (grant
248116).
6. References
[1] P. Ga¨rdenfors, Conceptual Spaces: The Geometry of Thought.
Cambridge, MA: the MIT Press, 2000.
[2] P. Baxter, “Foundations of a constructivist memory- based ap-
proach to cognitive robotics,” Ph.D. dissertation, University of
Reading, U.K., 2010.
[3] R. Wood, P. Baxter, and T. Belpaeme, “A review of long-term
memory in natural and synthetic systems,” Adaptive Behavior,
vol. 20, no. 2, pp. 81–103, 2012.
[4] E. H. Rosch, “Natural categories,” Cognitive Psychology, vol. 4,
no. 3, pp. 328 – 350, 1973.
[5] M. Posner and S. Keele, “On the genesis of abstract ideas,” Jour-
nal of experimental psychology, vol. 77, no. 3p1, p. 353, 1968.
[6] S. Reed, “Pattern recognition and categorization,” Cognitive psy-
chology, vol. 3, no. 3, pp. 382–407, 1972.
[7] R. Shepard, “Toward a universal law of generalization for psy-
chological science,” Science, vol. 237, no. 4820, pp. 1317–1323,
1987.
[8] R. M. Nosofsky, “Attention, similarity, and the identification-
categorization relationship,” Journal of Experimental Psychology-
General, vol. 115, no. 1, pp. 39–57, 1986.
[9] P. Baxter, R. Wood, A. Morse, and T. Belpaeme, Memory-Centred
Architectures: Perspectives on Human-level Cognitive Competen-
cies. AAAI Press, 2011, pp. 26–33.
[10] M. Bar, “The proactive brain: using analogies and associations to
generate predictions.” Trends in cognitive sciences, vol. 11, no. 7,
pp. 280–9, Jul 2007.
[11] R. Leech, D. Mareschal, and R. P. Cooper, “Analogy as relational
priming: a developmental and computational perspective on the
origins of a complex cognitive skill.” The Behavioral and brain
sciences, vol. 31, no. 4, pp. 357–78; discussion 378–414, 2008.
[12] A. M. Burton, “Learning new faces in an interactive activation and
competition model,” Visual Cognition, vol. 1, no. 2, pp. 313–348,
1994.
[13] P. Baxter and W. Browne, Memory as the substrate of cognition:
a developmental cognitive robotics perspective, 2010, pp. 19–26.
[14] A. Frank and A. Asuncion, “UCI machine learning repository,”
2010. [Online]. Available: http://archive.ics.uci.edu/ml
[15] E. Rosch, “Cognitive representations of semantic categories.”
Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, vol. 104, no. 3,
pp. 192–233, 1975.
[16] J. A. Hampton and M. M. Gardiner, “Measures of internal cate-
gory structure: A correlational analysis of normative data,” British
Journal of Psychology, vol. 74, no. 4, pp. 491–516, 1983.
[17] S. De Deyne, S. Verheyen, E. Ameel, W. Vanpaemel, M. J. Dry,
W. Voorspoels, and G. Storms, “Exemplar by feature applicability
matrices and other dutch normative data for semantic concepts.”
Behavior research methods, vol. 40, no. 4, pp. 1030–48, Nov
2008.
Proceedings of the Post-Graduate Conference on Robotics and Development of Cognition 
10-12 September 2012, Lausanne, Switzerland
11
